ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance has been criticized following the financial crisis of [2008] [2009] . Manipulation of accounting numbers and disclosure of false information in these banks showed that minority shareholders rights are not always protected. The main contests that minority shareholders have signaled are non-disclosure of relevant information, losses' reporting delay, and disclosure of false information. These bankruptcies lead legal authorities to develop new regulations in order to improve shareholders information. Also most prior research examining the relationship between disclosure and corporate governance has concerned the USA (Nagar et al., 2003; Ali et al., 2007) , a country where investors are highly protected and ownership is dispersed , and as a result the focus has mainly been on the agency conflict between managers and shareholders (type I agency conflict). However, recent studies show that ownership concentration is prevalent in most economies, for instance France, and the main agency conflict is in fact between controlling and minority shareholders (type II agency conflict called also principal-principal conflict) (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Faccio and Lang, 2002) . This paper investigates whether firm-level corporate governance mechanisms supplement regulation to protect minority shareholders. We focus on the impact on corporate transparency of different corporate governance mechanisms such as the proportion of independent directors in the board (Forker, 1992; Chen and Jaggi, 2000) , the board size, the CEO duality leadership (Forker, 1992; Ho and Wong, 2001) , ownership structure and shareholder relationships (Ho and Wong, 2001; Chau and Gray, 2002) . The French context is worth studying for many reasons: 1) France is a country which has been used as a typical representative of a weak investor protection country family (La Porta et al., 1999b) leading to ownership concentration; 2) many French listed firms are controlled and managed by families, providing more opportunities to expropriate minority shareholders; 3) French regulation allows the use double voting rights: this enables controlling shareholders to hold voting rights in excess of their cash flow rights, and exacerbates type II agency conflict (Faccio and Lang, 2002) .
Using a logistic regression on a sample of 81 non-financial French listed firms for the year 2004, we find a negative relationship between disclosure quality and (1) ownership and control concentration, (2) family control and (3) double voting rights. We conclude that type II agency 2 conflicts negatively influence disclosure quality. With high ownership and control concentration controlling shareholders are less reliant on minority shareholders and may expropriate them, particularly when their actions remain unpunished because of institutional context weakness. Consequently, controlling shareholders have fewer incentives to disclose information and will try to retain it to avoid minority contests. Interestingly, however, our result on the relationship between family control and disclosure of French firms contradicts the findings of Ali et al. (2007) in the US context, suggesting that type II conflict is more severe in France . we findperhaps surprisingly -no evidence of the influence of board characteristics on disclosure quality. Finally, the regression results show a positive relationship between disclosure quality and executive stock option plans. We suggest that executive stock option plans protect minority shareholders from expropriation by controlling shareholders, thereby compensating for the deficiencies in regulation to protect investors.
Our study contributes to the existing literature by providing new evidence on the growing agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders while prior studies focus on managershareholder agency conflict (Barros et al., 2013) . Our research also incites regulators to pay more attention to principal-principal conflicts. Present French regulations on corporate governance focus on manager-shareholder agency conflict, whereas the main agency conflict in France is in fact the conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews prior literature and presents the hypothesis development. Section three provides the research design. Results and conclusions are reported in sections four and five respectively.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Code law countries (such as France) offer weak investor protection compared to common law countries (La Porta et al., 1999b) . Corporate governance play a key role to safeguard the financial reporting process (Bassett et al., 2007) . Hence, corporate governance mechanisms, at the firm-level can supplement weakness of the country-level regulation to protect investors. The corporate governance attributes examined in this study are board characteristics (board size, proportion of independent directors in the board, unitary leadership structure (where the same person is CEO and chairman of the board), existence of executive stock options and ownership structure.
Corporate disclosure and minority expropriation
Previous studies point out that widely-held firms suffer from more severe manager-shareholder conflict than their counterparts; consequently, the demand for public information is higher (Gelb, 2000; Chau and Gray, 2002) . However, in a context of ownership concentration (for instance France) agency conflicts result more from conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (principal-principal problem) (Fan and Wong, 2005) , and therefore disclosure should be affected differently. Because of their proximity to management, controlling shareholders can obtain private information (Johnson et al., 2000) and are therefore reluctant to publicly disclose information to avoid minority contests. Also, Fan and Wong (2002) find that controlling shareholders report accounting information for self-interested purposes, which results in less credibility in reported earnings. Similarly, Attig et al. (2006) posit that controlling shareholders have incentives to minimize and delay corporate disclosure. Lower and/or later disclosure helps controlling shareholders to increase the chance of executing their plans or to ensure minority shareholders' decisions are based on inadequate information (Attig et al., 2006) . Thus, disclosure quality should be poor in firms with high ownership concentration. We state the first hypothesis:
H1: There is a negative relationship between disclosure quality and ownership concentration.
Controlling shareholders hold a high percentage of voting rights; they can therefore easily control the firm, and it is their disclosure strategy which leads to poor disclosure quality. Control concentration creates an entrenchment problem that allows controlling owners' self-dealings to go unchallenged internally by boards of directors or externally by takeover markets (Fan and Wong, 2005) . Also, due to the entrenchment effect that comes with control of the firm (Morck et al., 1988) , controlling shareholders' decisions deprive minority shareholders of their information rights 3 particularly in a context of weak legal system (Fan and Wong, 2002) . We present the following hypothesis:
H2: There is a negative relationship between disclosure quality and controlling shareholder voting rights.
The non-respect of the "one share one vote" rule in France (via double voting rights for instance) confirms weak investor protection in France and gives controlling shareholders voting rights in excess of their cash flow rights Fan and Wong, 2005) . Agency theory argue that principal-principal problem resulting from the lack of convergence between the interests of controlling shareholders and those of minority investors is magnified when there is a discrepancy between cash flow and control rights (Boubaker and Sami, 2011; Liu and Magnan, 2011) . For instance, Attig et al. (2006) find that stocks with greater deviation between ultimate control and ownership have a larger information asymmetry component in their bid-ask spread, suggesting poor disclosure quality in these firms. This result is also consistent with Schmid (2009) who observe that the deviation of control from ownership is associated with more selfish behavior by the ultimate shareholder. Hence, we pose the following hypothesis:
H3: There is a negative relationship between disclosure quality and the separation between voting rights and cash flow rights.
France has a higher proportion of family-owned and controlled companies than Anglo-American countries: more than 50% of French firms are controlled by family groups (Faccio and Lang, 2002) . In family firms, family members actively participate in the management of the firm and serve as directors on their board (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009; Ho and Fei, 2013) . They therefore have private information to assess the return on their investment. Comparing to non-family firms, family firms need less external financing and consequently, external information demand is low. Thus, consistent to the information financing need hypothesis, family firms have less incentive to disclose (Chau and Gray, 2002; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009 ).
Other studies evidence that compared to non-family firms, family firms face less severe manager-shareholder conflict, but more severe principal-principal conflict (Ali et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008; Ho and Fei, 2013) . These characteristics are likely to influence disclosure quality. First, because of less separation between ownership and management, family firms present lower type I agency conflict, less information asymmetry and better disclosure quality. Second, when the controlling shareholder is a family, he has more strong incentives to expropriate minority shareholders than a widely held corporation because private benefits of control are not diluted among several independent owners ultimately (Villalonga and Amit, 2006) . Thus, type II agency conflicts is higher is family firms. Also, family shareholders can easily extract private benefits with the help of a board dominated by family members that can strongly influence its decisions (Hope et al., 2012) . Consequently, they have incentives to limit disclosure in order to continue to easily expropriate private benefits.
To summarize, difference in the quality of disclosure between family and non-family firms would depend on the difference in the severity of their Type I and Type II agency problems. For instance, Chen et al. (2008) examine the voluntary disclosure practices of family firms and find that compared to non-family firms, family firms provide fewer earnings forecasts and conference calls, whereas Ali et al. (2007) find a positive relationship between disclosure and family ownership suggesting that type I conflict exceeds type II conflict in the USA. The characteristics of French family firms raise interesting questions about their corporate disclosure practices. We suggest that French family firms face more severe type II conflicts than their American counterparts and that these conflicts exceed type I agency conflicts. We therefore state the following hypothesis:
H4: Family-controlled firms provide poor disclosure quality.
Corporate disclosure and board characteristics
Adoption of internal control devices such as independent directors, small-sized boards and separation of the roles of chairman and chief executive officer reduce agency conflicts (Baek et al., 2009 ) and could therefore reduce the benefits to be derived from withholding information. Consequently, such measures help to improve disclosure quality.
Inclusion of independent directors on corporate boards is a question that has received increasing attention from French regulations (Vienot report (1995) , Bouton report (2002)). Chen and Jaggi (2000) present two main arguments in support of independent directors. First, independent directors advise corporate boards on strategic decisions (for instance disclosure decisions). Second, boards with a higher proportion of independent directors exercise greater control and greater monitoring over managerial decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Barako et al., 2006) ; while board dominated by nonindependent directors, are more aligned with the manager which could harm shareholder interests and firm transparency. It is also assumed that independent directors have incentives to exercise their role of decision control in order to maintain reputational capital (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Baker et al., 2011) .
Inclusion of independent directors on boards is thus expected to improve the firm's compliance with disclosure requirements, which in turn, will enhance the comprehensiveness and quality of disclosure. Previous studies show a positive relationship between disclosure quality and the proportion of independent directors on the board (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Barako et al., 2006; Nelson et al., 2010; Barros et al., 2013) . Also, Patelli and Prencipe (2007) argue that independent directors represent an important control mechanism to protect the interests of non-controlling shareholders in the presence of a dominant shareholder. Thus, this control mechanism should counterbalance lobbying by non-independent directors who are more aligned with controlling shareholders. We state hypothesis H5:
H5: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of independent directors and disclosure quality.
When the CEO is also the chairman, the board cannot be an effective means to control management decisions, because obviously it is difficult to go against top management decisions when the chairman of the board is also part of the top management. Previous research has argued that CEO duality leadership harms shareholder's interests because it leads to greater managerial dominance since that individual is more aligned with management than with shareholders (Mak and Li, 2001; Hope and Thomas, 2008) . Ho and Wong (2001) assert that firms with CEO duality leadership enable the person who occupies both roles to withhold unfavourable information. Also, Forker (1992) finds that CEO duality leadership is negatively associated with disclosure quality. Based on these arguments, we propose the following hypothesis:
H6: There is a negative relationship between CEO duality leadership and disclosure quality.
While numerous studies have investigated the effects of board size on board effectiveness, empirical evidence is rather inconsistent. One explanation is the existence of two opposite directions (Jensen, 1993) . First, large boards are more likely to attract directors for reputation issue, and have independent directors with corporate or financial experience (John and Senbet, 1998; Xie et al., 2003) . Thus, a larger board might be better to enhance corporate governance. Second, this benefit may be offset by the incremental cost of poorer communication and decision-making inefficiencies that are often associated with large groups (Bantel and Jackson, 1989) . Thus, larger board size can reduce the board's ability to resist CEO control (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006) . Empirically, Yermack (1996) finds that firm valuation is negatively related to the size of the board. Consistent to these findings, Eisenberg et al. (1998) show a negative correlation between firms' profitability and board size in a sample of small and midsize Finnish firms. Thus, there seems no theory of prior evidence to find the association between board size and disclosure quality. Hypothesis H7 is thus stated in the null form:
H7: There is no relationship between board size and disclosure quality.
Corporate disclosure and executive stock option plans
Managers who benefit from stock option plans are presumed to be concerned about the economic consequences of their decisions, since their personal wealth depends on the value of their firm. Stockprice-based incentives in the form of stock-options mitigate the manager-shareholder agency problem.
Disclosure enhances stock liquidity and firm value (Iatridis and Alexakis, 2012) , and therefore managers interested in exercising their stock options have incentives to improve disclosure so as to 5 profit from these benefits. Empirically, Nagar et al. (2003) examine a sample of 1129 firms during 1992-1995 and evidence a positive relation between managers' disclosure activities and their stockprice-based incentives. They show that firms' disclosures are positively related to the proportion of CEO compensation affected by share price, and suggest that shareholders deliberately use stock options to reach their target level of disclosure. We thus hypothesize that firms offering their managers stock option plans should have good quality of disclosure, and our hypothesis H8 is as follows:
H8: There is a positive relationship between disclosure quality and the existence of executive stock option plans.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Sample and data
Our initial sample consists of all French listed firms included in the SBF 120 index in 2004. As in prior studies, we exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) since they operate in an environment where disclosure is more likely to be the result of specific legal and regulatory requirements rather than a response to agency conflict concerns (19 observations). We discard all firms with missing financial or corporate governance data (20 observations). The final sample thus comprised 81 companies. Board and ownership data, as well as stock options data, were handcollected from firms' annual reports, available from the AMF (financial market authority)'s website. Financial data are retrieved from the Compustat database.
We chose the SBF120 firms and the year 2004 because of information availability on the disclosure quality variable.
First, disclosure quality is a very difficult variable to measure in the French context. In the USA, a number of organizations assess firms' disclosures, for example the AIMR/CFA (Association of Investment Management Research, now the CFA institute), and the FAF (Financial Analysts Federation Corporate Information Committee). These organizations publish disclosure scores for a wide range of companies over a long period. Unfortunately, there are no similar data available for France. Also, disclosure score made by authors could suffer from subjectivity (choice of items list and items weight) (Marston and Shrives, 1991) .
Second, previous studies in France use the AGEFI best annual report prize to measure disclosure quality (Labelle and Schatt, 2005) . Similarly, we use the AGEFI prize to select firms with good disclosure quality. The AGEFI study awarded prizes to French listed companies for their quality of disclosure, measured by listing segment (e.g. alternative, and over-the-counter markets), disclosure channel (e.g. annual reports) and type of operations on the market (e.g. first-time listing). As prior research shows a positive relationship between the whole corporate disclosure level and the level of information included in the annual report (Lang and Lundholm, 1993) , we focus on AGEFI best annual report prize.
AGEFI study presents a short list of companies from the SBF120 index that were nominated for the best annual report prize. Following prior study (Labelle and Schatt, 2005) , we consider that shortlisted firms present good disclosure quality. Our dependent variable DISCL equals 1 if the firm was shortlisted and 0 otherwise. 
Model
We use the following regression model to test our hypotheses:
Where DISCL measures disclosure quality and FSCONTROL denotes firm-specific variables. All variables are defined in Table 1 . Descriptive statistics show that the majority shareholder's average percentage of voting rights is 33.7%, and the average Herfindhal index is 0.148. These high values prove that ownership and control are concentrated in French firms, in contrast to the American firms studied in most prior research, which have diffuse control and ownership. Our results are consistent with the findings of La . We also find that 50.62% of firms in the sample are controlled by families, which is similar to the findings of (Faccio and Lang, 2002) . As expected, the descriptive statistics reveal that most of the sample firms display separation between voting rights and cash flow rights (54.32% of our firms use double voting rights). We also calculate the dominant shareholder's voting rights in relation to his cash flow rights, and find that the voting rights of the dominant shareholder exceeds their cash flow rights by 21.7% on average. These results prove ownership concentration, the predominance of family-controlled firms, and the separation between ownership and control in France. We conclude that this context is appropriate to examine principal-principal conflicts (controlling vs. minority shareholders). Among the sample of 81 firms, 24 firms were shortlisted for the prize, indicating that they offer good disclosure quality. These firms represent 29.63% of the total sample. Table 3a and table 3b 8 present the characteristics of the two subsamples: firms with good disclosure quality and firms with poor disclosure quality. Many differences are observed between the two subsamples. Compared to firms with poor disclosure quality, firms with good disclosure quality are less controlled by families (12.5 % vs.
66.67%), use double voting rights less (37.5% vs. 61.4%), have a higher proportion of independent directors on their boards (56.9% vs. 37.6%) and lower ownership concentration (0.039 vs. 0.195) and control concentration (14.8% vs. 41.4%). Table 4 discloses the correlation matrix for the dependent variable (discl) and the whole set of independent variables. ***Insert Table 4 about here***
The correlation matrix shows that the independent variable (discl) is negatively and significantly correlated at 1% with ownership concentration (herfi), control concentration (vot1), and family control (fam), and positively and significantly correlated at 1% with board independence (independ), executive stock options (stock), size (logasstot), US and foreign listing (uscot and listing). The independent variable is also positively (respectively negatively) correlated at 5% with cac40 (dble). The direction of correlations is consistent with our hypotheses. However, multivariate analysis must be run before reaching any conclusion on the relationships.
The magnitudes of the pairwise correlations between some independent variables exceed 0.5, with the highest significant correlation being between vot1 and herfi (coeff.=0.96, p<0.01) which explains the use of two models (model 1 and model 2). Va1 and dble are two variables measuring the extent of the separation between cash flow rights and voting rights, which explains the correlation concern observed between them (coeff.=0.73, p<0.01). Also, board is positively and highly correlated with logasstot (coeff.=0.65, p<0.01). Tests are therefore performed to rule out any multicolinearity issue. Table 4: Correlation matrix  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15 Board measures board size. Independ measures the % of independent directors on the board. Herfi measures the ownership concentration and is calculated by the sum of the squared percentage shareholdings. Vot1 and Vot2 are respectively the voting rights of the largest and second-largest shareholder, Va1 is the voting rights of the largest shareholder divided by the portion of shares held. Debt is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Asstot is the firm's total asset value. Direct measures the number of independent directors. Dual is a binary variable that equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0 otherwise. Fam equals 1 if the largest shareholder is a family and 0 otherwise. Dble is a dichotomic variable indicating the existence of double voting rights. Stock is coded 1 if executives benefit from stock option plans and 0 otherwise. Listing equals 1 if the firm is cross-listed and 0 otherwise. Uscot equals 1 if the firm is US-listed and 0 otherwise. Cac40 equals 1 if the firm is part of the CAC40 index and 0 otherwise.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The multiple regression results are disclosed in table 5, showing coefficients and Z-statistics respectively. Due to the multicolinearity issue between vot1 (measuring voting rights concentration) and herfi (measuring ownership concentration), we develop two models: model 1 explains disclosure quality using vot1 while model 2 explains disclosure quality using herfi. First, we note that the 2 correct ranks are high, above 87.65%. Second, we find a negative and significant relationship between corporate disclosure and both ownership concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl index (β = -12.225, p .044) , and control concentration, measured by the controlling shareholders' percentage of voting rights (β = -6.589, p .065). Hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 are thus confirmed. Our results are consistent with previous research conducted in a high ownership concentration and poor investor protection countries (Chau and Gray, 2002; Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta, 2010; Gul et al., 2010) . First, with high ownership, entrenched controlling owners have more with incentives and opportunities to extract private control benefits at the expenses of outside investors (Gul et al., 2010) . Consequently, they withhold information in order to protect themselves and avoid minority contests. Also, when the controlling shareholders have a high proportion of voting rights, they can easily control the firm and manipulate its disclosures in order to continue expropriating minority interests.
Previous research argues, "As the largest shareholder of a dual-class firm typically holds more than 50% of voting rights but substantially less than 50% of cash flow rights, he pays less than 50 cents for each dollar of private benefits extracted from the firm" (Schmid, 2009) . Our results show that the coefficient for the variable measuring double voting rights is negative and significant (β = -1.582, p .061). Double voting rights give controlling shareholders proportionally more voting rights than their cash flow rights; as a result, their private benefits greatly exceed the potential value of firm losses due to decisions that harm the company's interests. This result is consistent with Khalil et al. (2008) findings suggesting that the separation between cash flow rights and control rights arising from the existence of dual-class shares exacerbates type II conflict and explains the negative effect on disclosure. However, the negative coefficient of the variable va1 is not significant. Thus we could not validate our third hypothesis.
As previously suggested, the impact of family control on disclosure reflects the difference between the respective effects of type I and type II agency conflicts (Chen et al., 2008) . Similarly to Chau and Gray (2002) , we find a negative and significant relationship between family control and disclosure quality, which confirms H4 (β = -2.184, p .016 in model 1 and β = -3.181, p .004 in model 2). This result suggests that for family firms, the decrease in disclosure due to type II agency conflict exceeds the increase in disclosure resulting from less severe type I agency conflict. This result is the opposite of findings reported by Ali et al. (2007) on a sample of US firms. Thus, our results are consistent with La , suggesting that French firms face more severe type II agency conflict than their American counterparts. Surprisingly, our results provide no evidence that the board characteristics influence disclosure quality (H5, H6 and H7). Nevertheless, our results are similar to previous studies that find no significant relation between disclosure level and board independence (Molz, 1988; Ho and Wong, 2001) , board size (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006) or CEO duality (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006) . One possible explanation is the substitution effect of governance mechanisms (Williamson, 1983) . Disclosure seems to make up for the ineffectiveness of a failing mechanism such as the separation of the two functions cited above, or independent directors.
With regard to the impact of executive stock options on disclosure quality, we find a positive and significant coefficient of the variable stock (β = 2.076, p .025). We confirm therefore the existence of a positive relationship between disclosure quality and executive stock option plans: hypothesis H8 is validated. This result is similar to prior literature (Nagar et al., 2003; Lakhal, 2007) . We suggest that managers are motivated to enhance disclosure in order to increase profitability, growth and liquidity (Iatridis and Alexakis, 2012) and improve their wealth.
Finally, we find a positive relationship between US listing and disclosure quality, and no relationship between disclosure quality and cross-listing. We conclude that the American market is more demanding as regards information than other markets. Firms listed on the American market are subject to very strict financial disclosure requirements.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper aims to verify whether the disclosure quality of the French companies is a function of corporate governance mechanisms in a context of weak investor protection. Prior studies confirmed this relation in the UK and the US, which are characterised by dispersed ownership and strong law enforcement. Of particular interest in this paper, is the testing of this relation considering the existence of important institutional differences (ownership concentration (La Porta et al., 1999a; Faccio and Lang, 2002) and poor investor protection (La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 2000) ).The French context appears to be an interesting one as it allows us to highlight a barely studied agency conflict: the one opposing controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (principal-principal conflict). Hence, this study contributes to the growing type II agency conflict literature, type II conflict has been less developed in accounting literature compared to type I agency conflict (managers/shareholders conflict) since most of prior studies have been made in common law countries, mainly in the USA and in the UK.
Our study give supports that double voting right exacerbates principal-principal agency conflict, which is in accordance that investors are not well protected in civil law countries, as France, compared to common law countries. This study shows that disclosure quality is weak in firms with both high ownership and control concentration, and where controlling shareholders, mainly families, hold double voting right shares. Double voting rights help controlling shareholders not to support all the consequences of their decisions in the general meetings, and therefore give them incentives to expropriate minority shareholders. This situation intensifies the type II agency conflict and leads controlling shareholders to retain information to avoid minority contests.
We find that family firms present poor disclosure quality. Our results contradict Ali et al. (2007) findings in the American context suggesting that French family firms face higher type II agency conflict than their American counterparts (La Porta et al, 1999) . We also find that independent boards and executive stock options protect minority shareholders rights which result in better disclosure quality. As suggested before, we argue that corporate governance mechanisms are likely to supplement regulation to protect investor rights. Under weak legal investor protection systems, independent directors and executive stock options protect minority shareholders from controlling expropriation.
However, our study present some limits. We face difficulties to measure disclosure quality in France due to the absence of disclosure quotation similar the FAF and AIMR ones in the US. We use the nomination to the best annual prize of AGEFI which is binary dependent variable to measure disclosure quality which suffers from lack of variability and reduce the choice of methodologies used. Second, although we use many control variables in our regression, we could introduce industry sector and growth ratio to control for disclosure quality. Nevertheless our results permit a better understanding of the disclosure determinants related to the corporate governance mechanisms, and may prove to be useful for standard setters and regulators.
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